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Can a universal basic income offer protection against the uncertainties of the labour market?¹

In brief:

• As a response to the wave of rationalisation brought about by the digitalisation of the economy, several analysts are championing a universal basic income (UBI) that would be paid to citizens regardless of income and assets. It would be financed by dismantling the present social security systems that – allegedly - would no longer be needed after the introduction of a UBI. Minimum wages and collective agreement would also be unnecessary if a UBI were to be introduced.

• The end of work is not in sight. Employment rates in most countries have risen in recent years and there are so many unmet needs in the world that there will be sufficient employment opportunities in future as well.

• The abolition of minimum wages and collective agreements would create a gigantic low-wage sector. Toping up low wages with the UBI would become the norm.

• A UBI would plunge many people into poverty, since it would not be sufficient to live on in the event of accidents, serious illness, disability or a need for long-term care. Better solutions have been found through the risk pooling and redistribution that characterise our social insurance systems. If progressive income tax were also abolished, all that would remain would be redistribution on a massive scale from the bottom to the top.

• However, the UBI’s promising relatives, such as minimum pensions, a universal basic income for children, the strengthening of social insurance and development of citizens’ or wage earners’ insurance schemes and universal employment rights, are certainly worthy discussing.

¹ Based on my keynote address “Can a universal basic income resolve future income security challenges?” given at the 5th ILO Conference of the “Regulating for Decent Work Network: Future of Work”, Geneva 3-5 July 2017
1. Welfare state or universal basic income?

Today’s welfare states are a response to the extremely high risks to both income and jobs in the capitalist societies of the past. Developed welfare states not only protect citizens from social risks but also promote their personal development. The aim is to ensure that all citizens have a fair and equal chance of succeeding in life and, when they reach working age, to enable them to support themselves and their families through dependent employment or self-employment. Only those who for various reasons are unable to do so or are not of working age are entitled to a basic income, such as social assistance in Germany.

Welfare benefits come in two forms: cash benefits and benefits in kind. Free general education for all is one of the fundamental benefits in kind, along with healthcare. In virtually all welfare states, protection against the major risks encountered over the life course is provided through social insurance schemes. They are financed through compulsory contributions and, by spreading the risk, can be used to fund the extremely high expenditures required in some individual cases, in the event of accidents, illness or long-term unemployment. Poverty reduction programmes and a progressive taxation system that redistribute market incomes from the top to the bottom of the income distribution are two more of the pillars of modern welfare states. The same is true of labour law which, by conferring rights to, among other things, codetermination, minimum wages, paid holidays and dismissal protection and setting upper limits on working time, places social obligations on employers and protects employees from arbitrary corporate decisions.

National welfare states differ considerably, not only in scale but also in their institutional mix. The European welfare states and particularly the Scandinavian ones, are significantly more generous in the benefits they provide than the residual welfare states in the developed Asian countries or the USA. However, one characteristic common to all welfare states is that they contribute to the decommodification of labour (Esping-Andersen 1990) by reducing dependency on the market (albeit to very variable extents), providing financial support during periods without work and allowing individuals time to select the right job.

The high costs of the developed welfare states can be funded and politically legitimised only if citizens offer quid pro quos in return. It is expected that every citizen able to work takes up paid employment, contributes to the funding of the social budget and claims benefits only when needed. The most generous welfare states in the world in Scandinavia quite explicitly expect that all people of working age capable of working remain in paid work, preferably full-time, until they reach retirement age. The subsidies for single-breadwinner marriages (with the wife usually remaining at home) were abolished 50 years ago and even in structural crises no state-subsidised early retirement programmes were introduced. Instead, by promoting health,
reducing stress and strain at work and putting in place an active labour market policy, they tried, successfully, to maintain employability until retirement age and beyond. Only with the very high employment rates achieved in this way can the high levels of benefits in these countries be afforded. The lower employment rates are, the greater the burden that falls on families.

A number of commentators advocate a universal basic income (UBI), paid to all citizens, as an alternative to the complexities of the welfare state. In contrast to most welfare state benefits, it comes with no obligations attached to it and is paid to everyone, whether they are working or not.

The many different proposed versions of the universal basic income cannot all be discussed in a single paper. I will concentrate in what follows mainly on the internationally best-known reference publication by van Parish/Vanderborgt (2017) (vPV 2017) and will also examine the proposals put forward by Götz Werner (e.g. Werner 2007; Werner et al. 2017), who makes a similar argument. vPV (2017) claim to provide a comprehensive summary of the basic philosophy behind the various proposals for a UBI that have been put forward across the world and the underlying justifications and to distinguish it from other ideas. In addition, van Parijs is one of the founders of the Basic Income European Network (BIEN), which in 2004 morphed into the Basic Income Earth Network, now the most prominent international network of the UBI community.

According to vPV (2017), a basic income should be unconditional for two reasons. Firstly, take-up would be higher than for a means-tested basic income because many people are ashamed to reveal their neediness and therefore fail to claim the welfare benefits to which they are entitled. Secondly, there would be a reduction in bureaucracy, since it is often difficult to verify, as is required in a means test, whether individuals liable to pay support are cohabiting. At the same time, it is argued, the welfare state, with all its complex structures and procedures, could be replaced. The social welfare budgets would certainly be needed in order to fund the universal basic income. The basic income would lead to a healthy economy, less poverty and greater individual freedom, since it would be possible to refuse to engage in paid work. For these reasons, it is argued, the universal basic income is the only sustainable answer to all future income uncertainties (van Parish/Vanderborgt 2017).

Such munificent promises of around 1000 euros per month with no strings attached can act like a sugar-laced poison that is ingested merrily without thought for the consequences. However, is it really possible simply to rescind the basic rules of every social community, namely that prosperity and social security depend on a high work ethic and give and take? Certainly not! Even a universal basic income has its price. As with offers of free travel, this price is usually well concealed in order to keep the offer attractive.
However, if we are to carry out a realistic evaluation, we have to look carefully behind the scenes in order to reveal the hidden agenda. This is what I will do in what follows. I will begin by discussing the basic assumptions in the various proposals for a UBI about future economic and social developments that allegedly make it essential. Then I will investigate the costs of a UBI, which include above all the costs of abolishing the welfare state. Finally, sustainable alternatives – the promising relatives of the UBI – will be discussed.

Questionable basic assumptions about future economic developments

Abolition of the entire welfare state is an extreme proposal; consequently, the underlying rationale for it must be well founded, theoretically, empirically and ethically. vPV (2017) advance four reasons for the superiority of a UBI over the present social welfare system: (1) jobless growth as a consequence of the digitalisation of the economy; (2) negative employment effects of the welfare state; (3) inefficient and demeaning means testing in the current welfare states and (4) individuals’ ability to decide on their own path, without state aid. All four reasons contain empirically disputable arguments. Additionally, the fourth contains ethical statements on individual freedom which, allegedly, is curtailed by today’s welfare state. These four reasons will be briefly examined.

1) **Jobless growth:** The end of paid work as a consequence of the accelerating pace of rationalisation made possible by new technologies has already been predicted many times in the past (e.g. by Rifkin 1995). In reality, however, things have always evolved differently. Although a growing number of younger adults remain in training or education these days until age 25 or beyond, employment rates among the working-age population (15-64) have risen over the long term in virtually all OECD countries (Figure 1). The most important reason for this is increasing participation rates among women. However, the total volume of hours of paid work has increased only slowly or not at all, since annual working times have decreased as a result of working time reductions and the increase in part-time work. This has made it possible to distribute the total volume of work among more people. A second reason is declining rates of increase in hourly productivity in all developed countries despite the further diffusion of digital technologies (Figure 2). The Noble laureate Robert Solow wrote as early as 1987: "You can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics" (Solow 1987). This so-called productivity puzzle, which cannot be reconciled with visions of factories devoid of people, has preoccupied many economists. The slower productivity dynamic has been explained by the increase in personal services (care of the elderly, healthcare, childcare and education, leisure activities), which are resistant to rationalisation, a considerable increase in the data complexity of modern production processes and improvements in the quality of goods and services, which absorb productivity increases, the exhaustion of traditional sources of productivity, such as the
standardisation of parts and processes (Gordon 2016) and declining investment rates as a consequence of the austerity policies many countries have pursued (Herzog-Stein et al. 2017). Of course there continue to be leaps in productivity in individual companies and sectors, which justifiably trigger concerns about jobs. Thus even in the future, productivity in manufacturing industry will rise more quickly than in personal services, which may lead to job losses, enforced changes of employer and the loss of skills. All things considered, however, the available projections suggest that the number of jobs will be scarcely changed by the new technologies (Wolter et al. 2015). Thus we should not confuse structural change in an economy, which can certainly be very painful and has to be managed by means of an active labour market and employment policy, i.e. a functioning welfare state, with the end of work. The real risks to the employment level arise not from new technologies but from financial speculation and an austerity policy that does not allow sufficient investment in the future, i.e. in education, research and development, health and infrastructure, and fails to exploit to the full the potential of new areas of employment.

Figure 1: Employment rates in various developed countries 1983 and 2016

1) Korea: data from 1990 instead of 1983

Source: OECD 1997 and 2017
2) **Negative employment effects of welfare states:** vPV’s 2017 book offers no further evidence in support of this withering judgement than this one sentence: “Where the level of remuneration is and remains firmly protected by minimum wage legislation, collective bargaining and generous unemployment insurance, the result tends to be massive job losses” (vPV 2017: 5). The wealth of empirical research in this area, which leads overwhelmingly to the opposite conclusion, is completely ignored. Thus several meta-analyses of the employment effects of minimum wages come to the conclusion that they have few if any such effects. In their meta-analysis of more than 200 English-language studies of minimum wages, Belman and Wolfson state that “overall elasticities for the United States are both statistically insignificant and very close to zero, even when restricting the focus to teenagers and young adults” (Belman/Wolfson 2014: 402). Dolton et al. (2012) investigated the British studies and summarised their results as follows: “… there are small but significant positive employment estimates from 2003 onward, when the average bite of the National Minimum Wage was at its highest since its introduction.” Similar results are found in studies of the effects of other labour market institutions, such as collective agreements, unemployment benefit and dismissal protection. For example, unemployment rates are highest in the Scandinavian countries, which also have the highest rate of coverage by collective agreements. Strong protection against dismissal can trigger the development of internal numerical (by means of flexible working times) or functional (broad skill base and operational capability) flexibility, as it has in Germany, and encourage firms to invest more in providing initial and further training for their employees. Generous support for the unemployed gives them time to find a new job appropriate
to their skill level and thereby reduces the loss of important vocational skills in times of structural change. Of course excessively rigid regulations or unduly high wage increases can have an adverse impact on employment. However, the sharp increase in precarious and poorly paid jobs in most OECD countries shows that the problem today is not that social protection is overly generous but rather that it is too weak.

3) **Inefficient and demeaning means testing:** No mention is made of the fact that in the developed welfare states access to most benefits for the overwhelming majority of people is not dependent on means testing. This applies above all to social insurance benefits to which entitlement has been acquired through the payment of contributions. For a long time now there has been no charge for primary and secondary education and in many countries pre-school and higher education are also free to users. Labour market regulations, such as minimum wages, sick pay, entitlement to paid holidays and dismissal protection, are linked to the employment relationship and not to income. It is only as a result of the erosion of the welfare state in recent decades, the increasing inequality of market incomes, the persistently high unemployment and the politically driven increase in precarious employment that means-tested transfers have become increasingly important. Means-tested transfers have always had greater weight in countries with weak social insurance and only a residual welfare state, such as the USA and increasingly the UK as well. Means tests can of course be very demeaning, particularly if the feeling is conveyed that one is constantly under suspicion of cheating. In many instances the checks are also perceived to be illegitimate, for example when a person has worked hard all their life and is forced too soon on to the basic subsistence income because the period of entitlement to unemployment benefit has been shortened, as with the Hartz Acts in Germany. Excessively harsh monitoring of individuals that is perceived as illegitimate creates the conditions for the growing popularity of a UBI among the unemployed and those in precarious jobs. Even worse for those affected, however, is the complete absence of a basic subsistence income, as was the case in Italy, where an exiguous social welfare benefit was introduced for the first time in 2017.

4) **Individuals’ ability to decide on their own path without state aid:** vPv’s proposal (2017) for a UBI is based on a libertarian, anarchistic idea of human beings in which ‘freedom’ means absolute individual autonomy and “the ability to initiate a task and do it one’s own way, without orders from authorities who do not know the actual problem and the available means” (Goodman 1972). Proposals from left-leaning libertarians to decentralise the welfare state, e.g. by establishing cooperatives that would provide mutual support in various circumstances, are not even mentioned by vPv (2017). According to this libertarian notion of freedom, which is scarcely to be distinguished from Hayek and von Mises’ ordo liberal notion of freedom, the state systematically violates the individual’s right to freedom when it stipulates to what end contributions are to be paid and for what purpose transfers are to be used or even infantilises
citizens by providing services. From this point of view, transfers should be paid as cash benefits only, without any stipulation as to their use. The inhibition threshold in the polemical discrediting of benefits in kind, which constitute the majority of the expenditure incurred by health insurers for example, is set very low by vPV (2017) when they write: “It is no coincidence that the clearest and most general form of minimum income provided in kind is to be found in prisons” (2017: 13). Comparing the welfare state to a prison seems to be a popular device among libertarians. Werner, for example, compares the Hartz IV welfare system to an open prison regime (Werner 2007: 10). However, it is known from the extensive sociological research on inequality that some segments of the population are in a better position than others to seize opportunities and progress further. Children of prosperous, well-educated parents acquire so much social and material capital from their home lives that they start their lives under significantly better conditions than children from less advantaged backgrounds do. It is known, furthermore, that advantages and disadvantages accumulate over the life course and are passed on to the succeeding generation. Or to put it figuratively: “One can make the biggest mistake in choosing one’s parents”. Research also shows that critical events, such as unemployment, accidents or chronic illnesses can throw people completely off course (Anxo et al. 2010). The abolition of the welfare state would also lead to the disappearance of all programmes that seek to even out inequalities in initial opportunities and offer a way out of critical life situations. This would affect, for example, all assistance for young people and families, the advice and further training offered to the unemployed, rehabilitation programmes following accidents or illness and support services for the disabled (Bäcker et al. 2010). Social policy programmes of this kind strengthen the self-confidence and skills of those affected and increase the options open to them, thereby creating the conditions for individual autonomy. Here too, of course, there are aberrations, cases of unjustified paternalism that must be put right. However, the abolition of such social benefits would be to the detriment of the weakest members of society and would lead to a significant increase in social inequality.

The costs to citizens and the wider society of a universal basic income

Giving money to everyone, even the well off, without any conditions being attached to it, is extremely costly. This is especially true when the UBI is so high that recipients can actually afford to decline paid work and still lead a decent life. vPV 2017 (2017: 11) propose distributing 25% of GNP via a universal basic income, which according to their calculations would amount to $1,163 in the USA and £910 in the UK. Werner, the founder of the DM retail chain, proposes a UBI of €1000 per month for every citizen, including children and pensioners (Werner et.al. 2017). Like vPV (2017), he argues that the basic income would finance itself, since it replaces the welfare state. Some advocates of a UBI suggest that the basic income should be financed by
means of a progressive income tax (Straubhaar 2017), while others argue that it should be funded through an increase in VAT, which would produce very different distribution effects. If a highly progressive income tax were introduced, higher earners would simply see the basic income taken from them through the tax system, so that only lower earners would retain it as part of their net income. The most radical proposal comes from Werner, who advocates the abolition of all taxes with the exception of VAT. He dubs income and corporation taxes “crimes against new shoots” (Werner et al. 2017) because, it is argued, they suppress the tender shoots of future investment and thereby endanger economic growth (Werner 2005; Werner et al. 2007). Furthermore, Werner declares, VAT is equitable since all income is ultimately expended. The enormous amounts of money involved in financial speculation show that this is absolutely not the case.

The vast majority of the proposals for financing the UBI remain very vague. Advocates of the UBI have so far not regarded it as necessary to do anything more than give approximate estimates of what the exact tax rates on the revenue side and the costs incurred as a result of the missing social benefits would be, although some of them have been advocating a UBI for decades. The extensive empirical literature on the distribution effects of taxation, which clearly substantiate the regressive distribution effects of VAT (e.g. Bach/Grabka/Tomasch 2015; Bach/Beznoska/Steiner 2016), seems to be unknown to the authors. vPV (2017) conceded that a UBI might reduce economic growth somewhat, but do not see this a major problem, unless “it dries up the source on which the funding of the basic income depends” (2010: 133).

The extent to which these proposals are based on uncovered cheques is shown by an approximate estimate of the costs of a UBI of 1000 euros per month for Germany. A UBI of this amount would cost 984 billion euros per year, which is more than 31% of GNP and exceeds the current German social welfare budget by around 100 billion euros. In a statistical model without negative growth effects, which is in itself a heroic assumption, the VAT rate would have to be raised from its current level of 19% to around 150% if it were to replace all other taxes. It is scarcely conceivable that a VAT rate at that level would not have any negative effects on consumption, investment or growth, to say nothing of the massive incentives for avoiding VAT by purchasing abroad. As already noted, VAT has regressive distribution effects, so that lower earners would suffer most from such a massive hike. The increased rate of VAT would feed through into prices, causing the value of the UBI to fall dramatically. This devaluation would force people to look around for work, but this time in a deregulated labour market without minimum wages, collective agreements or dismissal protection.

Besides the costs on the revenue side of the UBI, the costs incurred through the loss of other transfers after the abolition of the welfare state have also to be taken into account. A monthly income of 1000 euros is most decidedly insufficient to pay for a costly stay in hospital,
rehabilitation or retraining, to say nothing of chronic illnesses. If one wants to have more than 1000 euros per month in one’s old age, one would have to make private provision, since any state pensions above that limit would no longer exist.

The present-day welfare state is a response to different needs at different points in the life course, for which solidarity answers have been devised. The need for such solutions will make itself felt again indirectly. Werner et.al. (2017) concede that a basic health insurance scheme might be necessary but without defining how ‘basic’ this insurance is to be and what additional costs might be incurred. Finally, a change of paradigm is costly, unless pensioners are to be dispossessed, which is hardly a promising political project. However, if their entitlements and assets are to be respected, the younger generation will have to fund not only the UBI but also older people’s accumulated entitlements to care, which will be virtually impossible to explain to them.

The UBI’s promising relatives

Avoiding demeaning means tests is also the concern of other proposals which, by virtue of this shared basic concern, can be included in the IBU’s extended family. However, since they do not simply scatter the money around but target specific problems, which means the benefits also remain fundable, they belong to the more interesting part of the family. The following ideas in particular are promising:

1) A universal basic income for children: Atkinson (2015) proposes that a generous child benefit should be paid for all children in order to prevent child poverty (as well as poverty among their parents). This benefit would remain tax-free for low-income households but be reclaimed in part from the highest income groups by means of a progressive tax with a top rate of 65%.

2) Universal benefits in kind without fees for all citizens: the most important example of such benefits is the primary, secondary and, in some cases, tertiary education provided free of charge in OECD countries. This principle is also found in the health sector, as with the National Health Service in the UK for example, which is funded out of general taxation and to which all UK residents have access. The elimination of all financial barriers to access facilitates uptake of these services, which are of fundamental importance for individual development and well-being and establishing equal conditions for all citizens.

3) Strengthening of social insurance and development of citizens’ or wage earners’ insurance schemes: In order to increase the pressure on the unemployed to accept low-paid work, the period of entitlement to and level of unemployment benefit are kept deliberately low in many countries. As a result, many unemployed individuals quickly
find themselves in the means-tested systems. For many, the slide into the means-tested benefit system (Hartz IV in Germany) could be postponed by extending the period of entitlement to unemployment benefit for those who have paid their contributions for a long time, easing access to unemployment assistance for precarious employees and by strengthening collective bargaining so that individuals do not have to top up low incomes by in-work-benefits. In addition, membership of the unemployment, health and old-age insurance schemes could be extended to all people in work or even to all citizens.

4) *Minimum benefits for certain transfers*: Basic benefits of this kind are found in particular in old-age pension systems. The basic pensions in the UK, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Norway are intended to prevent not only poverty in old age but also the means tests required for supplementary social assistance when pension levels are too low. However, they are not absolutely free of conditions, since they are usually dependent on a minimum number of contribution or working years or residence in the country in question.

5) *Universal employment rights*: These rights are linked to a job or even to gainful employment of any kind. Many rights, such as those to paid holidays, sick pay, dismissal protection and a minimum or collectively agreed wage, are linked to an employment relationship. In recent decades, the universal nature of these rights has been systematically eroded as new forms of precarious work have emerged. In many parts of the world, it is standard practice for precarious employees, such as those on fixed-term or marginal part-time contracts, to be paid lower hourly rates and fewer social benefits than permanent full-time employees. Within the EU, equal pay regulations apply to most forms of precarious work. It is only by making such rights universal, through labour market regulations and their implementation, that labour market dualisation can be reduced. If these rights are associated with tax-funded transfers, as in the case of parental leave or access to paid further training, e.g. the Scandinavian further training grants for adults, then the self-employed must of course be included as well.

6) *A basic income as a final safety net*: For those who are unable to earn a living themselves, a basic income will still be necessary. In order to limit the costs and to legitimise these benefits in the eyes of the wider society, means testing and tests of fitness for work will be unavoidable for those affected of working age. However, such tests should be weighted in favour of the provision of support, for example in the form of training and further training with a view to improving employability or even subsidised work in a social labour market. Other kinds of quid pro quo are also
conceivable. For example, poor families in Brazil in receipt of financial support from the state in the form of the *bolsa familia* must send their children to school and have them vaccinated. If children are absent from school too often, their families are excluded from the programme.

These ideas have the advantage of strengthening rather than replacing the welfare state. The associated costs are manageable and can also be introduced in stages depending on the state of economic development and political power relations. Anti-poverty programmes with conditions attached to them could also be introduced in the many countries in which there is as yet no basic subsistence income. They could be used to improve the lives and health of children, which is not the intention of a UBI. Anti-poverty programmes can also be used to improve the infrastructure and housing situation in poor regions in order to strengthen the local economy. The ethical justification for such conditions differs in two fundamental ways from that for a UBI: (1) work helps to develop competences, autonomy and self-confidence and strengthens the feeling that one is a useful member of society; (2) sadly, not everyone is in a position to find their way out of poverty without assistance. To refuse this assistance and to remove the assistance that already exists by abolishing the welfare state is irresponsible since it would simply further entrench poverty and inequality.

**Conclusions**

The digitalisation of the economy, like globalisation, climate and demographic change and shifts in consumption habits, will lead to structural changes in the labour market. However, the end of work is not in sight. We are a long way from an economy devoid of people; in fact, the growth of the service sector means that productivity increases are actually declining. Employment rates have risen in most countries in recent years and there are so many unmet needs in the world that more efficient and climate-friendly production processes are necessary in order to improve living and working conditions.

Thus a UBI is not an appropriate response to future employment income uncertainties. It is being justified with ‘alternative facts’, such as the refuted statements about the end of work or the negative effects of labour market regulations and welfare states on employment. The welfare state is denounced as an undesirable intruder in individuals’ private lives, although most benefits are based on rights and actually strengthen individual autonomy. The extensive empirical research on these topics is simply being ignored and replaced by ad hoc assertions.

All income problems are supposed to be solved for everyone by a flat-rate payment of the same amount, although most recipients do not need the money at all and needs vary very considerably over the life course. Even the complete abolition of the welfare state would not be
sufficient to finance a UBI. Some authors, such as Werner, want to abolish another cornerstone of the European social model, namely progressive income tax. All that would remain would be a gigantic redistribution from the bottom to the top – and this neo-liberal dream is still being sold as welfare.

The UBI has been advocated by many authors, such as vPV and Werner, in some cases for decades. They have had enough time to develop their arguments and submit authoritative estimates of the costs and proposals for funding. To date, however, they have not made any serious attempts to do so. If too many details were provided, the simple message of salvation would only be spoilt.

The forces and interests that are the most important drivers of social change go completely unmentioned. But who, after closer consideration, could support a UBI? The middle classes may find a UBI very appealing at first sight because they want to do something of benefit to the disadvantaged. However, when they realise that their pensions and health insurance would be under threat, along with their dismissal protection and good salaries, they will soon bid farewell to this particular project. Support for the UBI can be found among the chairs of large high-tech companies in Silicon Valley and, in Germany, from Deutsche Telekom and Siemens. They see an opportunity to be able to hire and fire workers without any annoying regulations and to keep the losers in structural change quiet with a ‘closure premium’. As in Italy, they can find support among the unemployed and those in precarious employment who no longer expect anything from the state. However, since the CEOs want to pay less or, even better, no tax at all, the UBI will be neither unconditional nor so high that recipients will be able to survive without seeking additional paid work in a now completely deregulated labour market. The aim of the UBI, namely “….to make less unequal real freedom, possibilities and opportunities“ (vPV 2017: 107), will not be realised. At the same time, however, and this is perhaps the most important aspect of the hidden agenda – the political energies of the numerous supporters of a UBI are being diverted away from support for more sensible projects. For this reason, faced with such ingratiating rhetoric and do many promises, one should indeed be sceptical.
References


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